Two points. First, where is the insurance element in your proposal of the emplyment accounts? As it is described in the text I see not difference with a normal savings account. Moreover, it is inferior to a life insurance policy given that the latter is in fact insurance and it enables to bridge temporary liquidity difficulties (I think in the case of mine, I can do for up to three years).

Second, I can’t really agree with your comment of the appropriateness of ECB measures. First, cost-push shocks make monetary policy difficults since they induce a trade-off between price and output stability. It comes out from any standard monetary model (and also the ones your fellow Belginas excel so much) that the optimal response to this is to increase rates, mostly precisely because of the danger of wage-price spiral. You warn from the risks of long-term unemployment paraller to that of the 70s, but it should be then also added that loose monetary policy in the 70s heaviliy contributed to it (hence the literature on pre and post-Volcker era). Moreover, deacreasing rates would have no effect due to the credit crunch. Financial sector is totally screwed up, causing the classic credit channel of monetary transmission to be ineffective. Do you really think that banks, desperatelly grasping for liquidity, would actually extend more credit if the ECB cut rates for 50 bp, say? On the other hand, it is precisely the strong euro acting as the main absorber of imported inflation that you see as the main cause for increase of CPI inflation. You say that weaker dollar relative to the euro would push soaring oil prices even further. Yes, but denominated in dollars. If weak dollar relative to the euro were the dominant cause for soaing oil prices it would be precisely the appreciated exchange rate the reason for having exactly no imported inflation. But given that the reasons for soaring commodity prices lie elsewhere, strong euro importantly contributes to containing inflationary pressures.

Cheers,
Igor