GOST razgledi.net
Sonja Biserko
Chairwoman of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia
biserkos@eunet.yu
The recent declaration of independence of Kosovo provoked the usual response from Serbia. Once again Serbian politicians could not abandon their idea of a Greater Serbia. And once again the security and democratic consolidation of the entire region was threatened. Fiery speeches by Serbia’s leaders urging the demoition of foreign embassies, and even demonising non-governmental agencies, demonstrated the depth of anti-Western feeling. Although eight years have elapsed since Milosevic’s ouster, Serbia is still not even close to a much needed change of political direction and a clear idea of its role in Europe.
A clear understanding of the current situation in Serbia requires a re-examination of the whole Yugoslavia crisis and how the events have been interpreted in Serbia. Fear of what a transformation to democracy might bring has prevented its leaders from facing up to historic developments in the region.
The glorification of the traditional, “authentic” Serbian values and a continuing political and media campaign against Europe and the West have resulted in widespread scepticism towards Western democratic practices. Serbs see their country as a historically correct nation, now victimised by the world powers. This attitude, removed from reality, has plunged the nation into permanent conflict with its neighbours and the rest of the world, generating frustration, arrogance and aggression at home. Unable to confront the recent past, including bringing to justice war criminals, this outlook has almost destroyed the country’s potential for a democratic transition and the creation of a modern state.
Despite the fact that 70% of the general public favours closer ties with the EU, ruling factions have generally preferred to retain traditional, patriarchal, conservative, Christian Orthodox values. And although unwilling to join the move towards becoming a part of modern Europe, in order to survive it did accept foreign economic aid.
Failure to resolve the issue of Serbia’s identity has only deepened the people’s frustration. They just don’t know where the country is going. From 201 to 2003 the direction was towards Europe. When there was a change in leadership in 2003, following the assassination of the liberal Zoran Djindjic, Serbia defined itself as a neutral country but aligned with Moscow. Any further change now requires vast social and economic reforms and an enlightened leadership. There is no apparent leader to drive these reforms.
Matters have not been helped by the attitudes of the international community, especially of the EU. Initially it pursued a policy of appeasement towards Serbia because it was regarded as central to the maintainance of peace and stability in the Balkans. That was particularly the case in the period after the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic. But in time this policy of appeasement lost its meaning, because, unlike the other countries in the region who were galvanised by the prospect of the EU membership, Serbia failed to show any real interest in getting closer to the EU.
The international community gradually realised that Serbian radical nationalism was still alive and kicking, even after hundreds of thousands of war dead, even after all the devastations in the region, and even after the first NATO intervention in Europe after Wold War II. Even today, the Serbian nationalists’ priority remains the unification of all Serbs, as defined by Slobodan Milošević and the Serbian Academy Memorandum of 1986!
The international community eventually became a major factor in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, through its mediation of peace accords, the distribution of humanitarian aid, the establishment of the Hague Tribunal, institution building, the establishment of a framework for democratic transformation, and even direct military intervention. The EU’s role has been especially important in developing the road map for a democratic transformation and integration of the Balkans into European structures.
The necessary changes to Serbia must come from the within, but external support, in particular EU support, is needed. This support should encourage an independent media, small-scale enterprises, trade unions, student and youth organisations, always assisting the efforts by the democratic part of the society, still quite a small one, to widen the space for Europeanisation and democratisation. A critical mass of intellectual and cultural elites may need to facilitate the conditions for genuine democratic change, based on a truly European, democratic blueprint.
The specific steps the EU can take to help bring Serbia closer to Europe are:
• Support the establishment of a “Coalition for Europe” that would include representatives from all groups. This support would be helpful for the forthcoming local elections and, possibly, also the parliamentary elections;
• Involve the general public in the EU’s political dialogue with Serbia;
• Establish a regional task force to consider the Western Balkans’ European future;
• Support the establishment of a new education system that promotes European values;
• Include human rights organisations as partners in the creation of a new cultural model;
• Scrap the current visa arrangements, introducing a large-scale student exchange programme, and promote the inclusion of young Serbians into the European educational system;
• Invite as young professionals to attend training courses organised by the EC;
• Strengthen contacts and co-operation between Serbia’s young political leaders within the EU framework and the region;
• Allow civilian sector organisations access to EU funds;
• Kick-start regional courses for graduate students in international law;
• Assist the independent local media with the professional/vocational training of young journalists;
• Intensify all people-to-people exchanges.
At this juncture I believe that the international strategy for Serbia has to become more focused and comprehensive. It has to help in restraining the expansionist course of the present rulers, and in restoring the damaged moral and social fabric. But so far the EU and other organisations have not seriously considered such a course of action. The social reconstruction of a possible failed state in the heart of Europe is a new, difficult, long-lasting and still untried experience. Its importance for the democratic change in Serbia and peace and security in the Balkans cannot be overestimated.
* članek je v izvirniku objavljen na spletni strani Europe’s World
